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ism:    
Having inherited a constitution negotiated between the colonial and 
liberation forces at the dawn of independence (the Lancaster House 
Constitution) in 1979 and having amended that constitution 19 times in 
the last 30 years, Zimbabwe is trying for the second time in just over 
a decade to completely overhaul its constitution. The first attempt 
to create a new constitution failed when voters at the referendum 
rejected the proposed constitution in February 2000. The major 
grievance was in regards to the process of making the new constitution, 
which civil society groups criticised as dominated by, and intended to 
advance, government interests. The current process, which is led by 
a Parliamentary Committee (Copac), is part of the agreed package of 
reforms in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that should culminate 
in a referendum in 2011. 
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Experience since independence has demonstrated the 
government’s pre-occupation with the constitution as a 
means of legitimising its power and less as a mechanism 
for limiting such powers. A number of the 19 amend-
ments have served to reverse the effect of decisions 
made by the courts of law and some have even ousted 
the jurisdiction of the courts leading effectively to the 
concentration of power within the executive branch of 
government. The government appears to have been in-
terested only in legality/constitutionality and paid scant 
regard to constitutionalism by which principles govern-
mental power must be limited.
This article demonstrates the dearth of constitutional-
ism by analysing some court decisions and constitutional 
amendments that have effectively eroded the limits 
on governmental power. This article also warns that a 
narrow focus on constitutionality can mean that instead 
of the constitution being the supreme legal document 
controlling the exercise of state power, it simply becomes 
an instrument for autocratic control, legitimising rather 
than preventing arbitrary power – the very antithesis 
of constitutionalism. This article demonstrates that 
constitutionality is not enough and that to promote 
democracy, it is necessary to implement the principle of 
constitutionalism. The article draws heavily on Zimba-
bwe’s recent constitutional history to illustrate short-
comings in regards to constitutionalism. It will argue 
that through the colonial period and most of the post-
independence era there has been an erroneous focus by 
successive governments on mere constitutionality (or 
simple legality) at the expense of constitutionalism. 
Overall, this article advocates a serious re-evaluation of 
the collective attitude and approach towards the consti-
tution; that in making it, concern is not only in defining 
what is constitutional but also in ensuring that those 
constitutional clauses conform to and advance the prin-
ciples and values that underpin constitutionalism. The 
hope is that as Zimbabwe undertakes the drafting of a 
new constitution, those tasked with drawing up the draft 
can learn some lessons about the critical elements that 
are necessary for this purpose.
It is a basic tenet of constitutionalism that a consti-
tution is not simply a collection of rules and insti-
tutional arrangements regarding the use of state 
power but it is, in addition, about placing limits on 
that power (Belz 1998). It is the idea that govern-
ment should be legally limited1 and that the authority 
of government is dependent on the enforcement of 
such limitations against itself (Wormuth 1949). The 
principle says that a constitution not only describes 
but also restrains government. The core idea of con-
stitutionalism is probably best encapsulated in the 
words of one of the Founding Fathers of the United 
States Constitution, James Madison, who wrote in 
The Federalist No. 51, 
“In framing government which is to be administered 
by men over men, the greatest difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable government to control the gov-
erned; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
control on government but experience has taught 
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”2
This passage confirms three critical points: 
• First, that a government is necessary and that its 
power must be facilitated to enable it to have control 
and to fulfil the interests of the governed;
• Second, that government cannot be completely 
trusted with power and that this power must there-
fore be restrained (Allen & Thomson 2005); and,
• Third, whilst acknowledging the role that people 
may play in controlling government it says that this 
is inadequate and unreliable and therefore that it is 
necessary to create ‘auxiliary precautions’ to control 
governmental power. As Wormuth (1949) states, con-
stitutionalism is synonymous with these ‘auxiliary 
precautions’.
According to Kay, “The special virtue of constitu-
tionalism … lies not merely in reducing the power 
of the state, but in effecting that reduction by the 
advance imposition of rules.”3 Furthermore, as as-
serted by Wormuth, the legitimacy of governmental 
authority turns on its enforcement of the rules limit-
ing its authority. In this regard, it may be said that 
constitutionalism is synonymous with the rule of 
law, which is the more commonly used terminology. 
Constitutionalism
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Having captured the essence of constitutionalism it is 
important to elaborate on the concept of constitution-
ality and draw the distinction between them and in the 
process show the significance of constitutionalism. 
Simply defined, constitutionality is synonymous with 
legality but in a very mechanical sense. In determining 
constitutionality, one looks at the words of the con-
stitution and then considers the conduct of the state, 
the question at all times being whether the state has 
complied with the constitution. If the conduct of the 
state conforms to the words of the constitution that 
is the end of the enquiry for the answer would be that 
it is constitutional. It does not matter that the powers 
provided for in the constitution are excessive. In this 
regard, the constitution is not serving the purpose of 
limiting power but simply facilitating the exercise of 
power, however excessive it might be.
The following example sheds more light on the problems 
of a narrow focus on the question of constitutionality: 
Suppose the constitution includes a clause that provides 
that the state may expropriate shares held in companies 
operating in industries regarded as critical and that in 
all such cases the courts of law shall have no jurisdic-
tion to hear any challenges against expropriation. 
Suppose further that the state proceeds on this basis 
to expropriate shares in companies operating in the 
mining industry. By this act, all shareholders will lose 
their property. Ordinarily they should, like other prop-
erty owners, challenge the expropriation in a court 
of law on the basis of the right to private property. 
However, in this case that right has been removed. 
Considered through the narrow lens of constitutional-
ity, it may be concluded that the state has acted consti-
tutionally by following the terms of the law. Yet clearly, 
such conduct is sure to cause serious concern given that 
the power accorded to the state is arbitrary and prone to 
abuse. The removal of access to the court means there 
is virtually no scrutiny of governmental action and no 
protection of the law for individual shareholders. 
In this instance, it might be said that whilst the 
conduct meets the test of constitutionality in the me-
chanical sense of complying with the terms of the con-
stitution, nevertheless considered through the broader 
and more qualitative lens of constitutionalism, such 
conduct falls short of the expected standards as there 
is no limit whatsoever on the power of the state. 
So in conclusion, we see that even though constitution-
ality may be satisfied, there can be a huge gap when 
considered through the lens of constitutionalism. 
In this regard, it is important to recognise that any 
form of the state, whether liberal or authoritarian, 
can have a constitution. Indeed, many dictator-
ships ranging from Hitler’s Nazi Germany, European 
colonies in Africa, Apartheid South Africa and more 
recently, post-independence one-party states in Africa 
have been governed through constitutions of one sort 
or another. These constitutions gave them authority to 
govern – in the majority of cases unlimited authority 
over the governed. Retrospective laws were permitted, 
the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted in some cases, 
civil rights were abrogated under the law, and discrim-
ination, exploitation and other wrongs were justified 
under these constitutions. Yet in all cases, the dicta-
tors and colonisers would argue that they were acting 
in terms of their respective constitutions. They would 
state that their conduct was legal simply because they 
were complying with the letter of the law. True, the 
constitutionality test would probably have been met in 
most cases but it could not be said with any degree of 
seriousness that there was constitutionalism as there 
were no limits at all on state power.
Proponents of constitutionalism argue that the whole 
idea of a constitution is premised not simply on grant-
ing power to the state but controlling and restraining 
the exercise of this power. Constitutionalism is, in the 
words of Allen and Thomson, “set in contradistinc-
tion to arbitrary power” (2005: 13). They argue that 
government is established in order to promote and 
protect certain values that society cherishes – justice, 
freedom, liberty, due process, etc – but it is necessary 
to control government power so that its exercise does 
not destroy the very values that it was intended to 
promote. Therefore, constitutionalism does acknowl-
edge a role for government but requires mechanisms 
to ensure that it is brought under control. When power 
is unrestrained, the risk of arbitrary action is high and 
consequently, it becomes difficult to protect the rights 
of the governed. 
A document that facilitates an authoritarian regime 
may be labelled a constitution but it does not neces-
sarily follow that it upholds constitutionalism. It is 
important at this stage to turn to a historic example 
that demonstrates a failure of constitutionalism in 
Zimbabwe. This illustration shows the consequences 
of the lack of such ‘auxiliary precautions’ and why 
constitutionalism is necessary. 
Constitutionality
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Constitutional Amendment No. 17  
of 2005
In September 2005, the parliament of Zimbabwe 
passed Constitutional Amendment (No. 17). This 
amendment dealt with a number of issues, including 
property rights, freedom of movement and also 
re-introduced the Senate as the upper chamber of 
Parliament. The amendment is a perfect example of 
the government’s obsession with constitutionality, 
while negating the principles of constitutionalism.
The amendment raises questions regarding the 
purpose of a constitution and brought to the 
fore a need to distinguish constitutionality from 
constitutionalism. Rather than the constitution 
being the supreme law controlling the exercise of 
state power, it became an instrument for government 
control and the legitimisation of arbitrary actions. 
Retroactivity
The memorandum to the Bill introducing 
Amendment No. 17 stated that one of its principal 
aims was to insert a new provision to:
“confirm the acquisition of land for resettlement 
purposes which took place pursuant to the Land 
Reform Programme beginning in 2000, and provide 
for the acquisition in the future of agricultural 
land for resettlement and other purposes.” 
Under the new section 16B of the Constitution, 
title to all agricultural land was vested in the state 
regardless of whether it had been acquired before or 
after the amendment. Section 16B (2) (a) also stated 
that the state would not pay compensation for such 
acquired land except for improvements on the land. 
It is clear from the language that the proposed 
amendment was intended to apply retrospectively 
to ‘confirm’ land acquisitions that had already 
taken place since 2000. In other words, there was 
a tacit recognition that what had happened had 
not fully complied with the constitution and that 
this amendment was designed to give legitimacy 
to those acquisitions. However, one of the key 
tenets of constitutionalism is that law must be 
general and prospective as opposed to targeted at 
a specific section of society and retrospective. This 
amendment was not only retrospective but also 
specifically targeted white commercial farmers, 
who were the dominant landholders and who 
had been most seriously and negatively affected 
by the land reform programme since 2000. 
Ouster of Judicial Jurisdiction
Probably more significant is the provision under section 
16B which states that: 
“(3) The provisions of any law referred to in section 16(1) 
regulating the compulsory acquisition of land that is in 
force on the appointed day, and the provisions of section 
18(1) and (9), shall not apply in relation to land referred 
to in subsection (2)(a) except for the purpose of deter-
mining any question related to the payment of compen-
sation referred to in subsection (2)(b), that is to say, a 
person having any right or interest in the land: 
(a) shall not apply to a court to challenge the acquisition 
of the land by the State, and no court shall entertain any 
such challenge; 
(b) may, in accordance with the provisions of any law 
referred to in section 16(1) regulating the compulsory 
acquisition of land that is in force on the appointed 
day, challenge the amount of compensation payable 
for any improvements effected on the land before it 
was acquired.”
The legal and practical implication of this provision 
is that it ousted the jurisdiction of the courts of law in 
land acquisition matters. In so doing, parliament and the 
executive thwarted the role of the third arm of the state, 
the judiciary, and thereby violated another key principle 
of constitutionalism – namely the separation of powers. 
They also attempted to legitimise the abrogation of the 
individual right to the protection of the law by denying 
access to the courts, which is enshrined under section 18 
of the same Constitution. Overall, this was contrary to 
the principle of constitutionalism that requires checks 
and balances between the organs of the state in order 
to safeguard individual freedoms. Judicial review is a 
well established mechanism to control the executive’s 
power, enabling individuals to challenge the conduct 
of their government before an impartial and independ-
ent judiciary. By ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, 
this amendment was therefore eliminating a core tenet 
of constitutionalism.
Amendment No. 17 not only sought to legitimise arbi-
trary conduct carried out since 2000 but also opened the 
way for future arbitrary action by preventing access to 
the courts and the mechanisms such as judicial review 
that would normally act as ‘auxiliary precautions’ 
against abuse of state power. 
The executive branch of the Zimbabwean state was pre-
occupied with constitutionality in that it merely sought 
to clothe with legality the conduct that it had condoned 
since 2000 in respect of land acquisitions even though 
there was insufficient constitutional authority at the rel-
evant time. It sought, retroactively, to use the constitu-
tion to correct the serious legal anomalies of that period. 
More seriously, however, it sought to wreck the checks 
and balances that the judiciary would have provided 
against the use of this power. 
As I wrote at the time while critiquing Amendment 
No. 17, this process demonstrated that the constitution 
was seen by the government as an instrument to grant 
state power and legitimise excesses in the application 
of that power, but “when the constitution is created [or 
amended] to legitimise state actions and validate its 
exercise of power and remove limitations [to that power], 
the result is a constitution without constitutionalism. 
Legal constitutionality as opposed to constitutionalism 
is as dangerous as arbitrary rule.”
Judicial Challenge against Amendment No. 17
The removal of judicial jurisdiction in land acquisition 
matters was successfully challenged in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal. 
In the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al. v. Republic 
of Zimbabwe4 the SADC Tribunal held that the Govern-
ment of Zimbabwe had violated the SADC Treaty by 
denying access to the courts and engaging in racial dis-
crimination against white farmers whose lands had been 
compulsorily acquired. 
However, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had in 
January 2008 delivered judgment in a case also brought 
by the Mike Campbell and other white farmers5. The 
applicants before the Supreme Court had argued that the 
relevant parts of Amendment No. 17 violated the essen-
tial features or core values of the constitution regarding 
the constitution’s provisions as to security and protec-
tion of fundamental rights6. 
The Supreme Court dismissed this legal challenge. It 
confined itself to the question of whether parliament 
had followed the special procedure required under the 
constitution because section 52(1) of the constitution 
permitted parliament to effect constitutional amend-
ments. It held that parliament had complied with 
the special procedure and it was at liberty to amend 
the constitution. 
Of key significance for present purposes is the fact that 
the Supreme Court was simply making a procedural 
enquiry to determine the constitutionality of the amend-
ment process. It refused to make a qualitative assess-
ment of the content of the amendment to determine its 
effect on the core foundations of the constitution. The 
Supreme Court had a choice whether to confine itself 
to the question of constitutionality – in amending the 
constitution did the government follow the letter of the 
law? Or constitutionalism – did the amendment uphold 
and comply with the values and principles of the con-
stitution? The Supreme Court elected to confine itself 
to the first question and steered away from making an 
enquiry that would have tested the amendment’s perfor-
mance against the standards of constitutionalism. To the 
Supreme Court satisfying the procedural requirements 
was sufficient.
It is remarkable that in coming to that conclusion, the 
judicial arm of the state appeared to celebrate its own 
dismemberment by the other two arms of the state since 
the effect of Amendment No. 17 was to oust its jurisdic-
tion in land acquisition matters. The judicial attitude in 
this case has been attributed by various commentators 
to the absence of judicial independence in Zimbabwe, 
particularly in land-related cases. Some members of the 
judiciary had themselves been beneficiaries of the land 
reform programme and were being asked to pass judg-
ment in cases where they had an interest and could be 
said to have been compromised. Delivering the judgment 
for the Supreme Court, Malaba JA stated that the ouster 
of judicial jurisdiction was narrow and did not offend 
the principle of separation of powers. He argued that: 
“Taking into account the narrow ambit of the applica-
tion of the provisions of 16B(3) of the Constitution, I 
do not find attractive the argument that the provision 
undermines the balance of powers of the State between 
the Legislature and the Judiciary. The taking away of 
the functions of judicial power and giving them to a 
tribunal which is not a court of law is as valid an exercise 
of legislative power as the taking away of the functions 
and letting them lie dormant without giving them to any 
other body to discharge. What is objectionable as being 
in violation of the principle of separation of powers is for 
the Legislature to take the functions of judicial power 
and exercise them itself under the guise of a legisla-
tive judgment over facts and circumstances of a par-
ticular case.”
The final words of this quote show the judge’s desper-
ate struggle to justify the ouster of judicial jurisdiction 
because he is acknowledging in effect that taking the 
power to exercise judicial functions from the judici-
ary would violate the principle of separation of powers 
although he makes an exception in this instance. But 
parliament had in effect taken this power by pronounc-
ing both retrospectively and prospectively that the land 
acquisitions were perfectly legal. The legislature may not 
have directly stated that it was taking over the judicial 
role but by removing the judiciary from that function 
and pronouncing finality on the question of land acquisi-
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tions, the legislature, and through it, the executive had 
effectively taken over the judicial role7. 
Although the SADC Tribunal later ruled in favour 
of the applicants, the Government of Zimbabwe 
refused to comply with the judgment arguing that the 
SADC Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the matter 
– a position echoed by the Deputy Chief Justice of 
Zimbabwe, Malaba DCJ. The matter has dragged on 
since then but the key point to note in respect of the 
SADC Tribunal is that a judicial body, which can be 
said to have more neutrality in the matter, recognised 
that the changes effected through Amendment No. 
17 were inconsistent with constitutionalism. The 
grounds upheld by the Tribunal demonstrated two 
critical aspects of constitutionalism – namely that law 
must be general and prospective and not deliberately 
target a specific group of the population and secondly, 
that access to the courts is an essential right that 
must be constitutionally protected. In effect, the 
SADC Tribunal ruling challenged the legitimacy of 
Zimbabwe’s constitutional provision, which prevented 
access to the courts of law. 
What are the ‘Auxiliary Precautions’ that 
promote constitutionalism?
In light of the above discussion, it is pertinent to 
identify and highlight what Madison referred to 
as the ‘auxiliary precautions’ that are required to 
ensure control of state power and in that way promote 
constitutionalism. It is these ‘auxiliary precautions’ 
that provide the necessary mechanisms to engender 
and promote the spirit of constitutionalism. It serves 
as a reminder to those charged with drafting the 
new Zimbabwe constitution to pay specific attention 
to these fundamental features, which will help to 
establish a framework to promote the full realisation of 
constitutionalism. The list is by no means exhaustive 
but it is indicative of the general principles that may 
guide the process.
Separation of Powers
The principle of the separation of powers as expounded 
by French philosopher, Montesquieu, is simply that power 
must be divided between the three arms of the state: the 
Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. Parliament 
makes the laws, the executive executes the laws and the 
judiciary interprets those laws. The chief aim of consti-
tutionalism is to prevent the concentration of power in 
one arm of the state. The separation of powers is meant 
to provide effective checks and balances so that, for 
example, what the executive 
does is subject to judgment 
by the courts to ensure that 
it is in compliance with the 
laws made by parliament. In a 
constitutional democracy, par-
liament itself is free to make 
laws but only to the extent that 
such laws are in compliance 
with the constitution, that 
being the supreme law. 
Parliament may of course 
amend the constitution but only by following a special 
procedure. To prevent parliament abusing its power to 
amend the constitution in a manner that is contrary to 
the values upon which the constitution is based, one 
must look not to the inherent goodness of representatives 
that sit in parliament but to other ‘auxiliary precautions’ 
within and outside the constitution. One of these is to 
ensure that amendment of the constitution can only be 
done through the authority of a super-majority, usually 
a minimum of two-thirds of parliamentarians voting in 
favour of such an amendment. Where a political party 
has an overwhelming majority this safeguard can be 
of limited effect, which means it may be necessary to 
entrench some essential provisions of the constitution – 
placing them beyond the powers of parliament and allow-
ing amendment only through a referendum. 
The current constitution contains loopholes that threaten 
the principle of separation of powers. This article has 
already demonstrated the problems emanating from 
Amendment No. 17, which ousted the jurisdiction of the 
courts in specific instances relating to land acquisition 
matters. The role of the judiciary is even more important 
in contexts where the separation between parliament and 
the executive is blurred because the president’s party has 
an overwhelming majority in parliament. This usually 
means that there are no effective checks and balances 
between the two bodies and often parliament is no more 
than a rubber-stamp for the executive’s will. This article 
makes the case that in such scenarios an independent 
judiciary is even more critical to act as a check on both 
parliament and the executive. 
“The chief aim of constitutionalism is 
to prevent the concentration of power 
in one arm of the state.”
Another loophole that has been much-criticised is the 
Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act (Cap 
10: 20)8, which allows the Executive President to make 
temporary laws subject to parliamentary approval at 
a later stage. Properly used, it could be a useful legal 
instrument – such as in situations of extreme emergency 
– but experience has shown that it is too prone to abuse. 
It has, for example, been used at critical times such 
as election periods when the freeness and fairness of 
the elections have been compromised since the person 
making the laws is also a contestant. According to the 
Standard newspaper in 2004, alleged abuses of this 
power include banning industrial action after a series 
of successful strikes, amending land regulations and 
allowing police to detain people for 30 days if accused of 
economic or political crimes.
The power means the executive can take over legisla-
tive functions and, even if parliament may later refuse to 
extend the temporary legislation after the prescribed six 
months, it may by then have achieved its intended effect. 
It may be argued that such executive powers are neces-
sary at times and that properly applied, such powers 
make sense. Nevertheless, unless supported by specific 
conventions, the risk of abuse remains too high. The con-
stitutional provisions enabling these presidential powers 
to legislate require careful review during the drafting of 
the new constitution.
Bill of Rights and Entrenchment Provisions
A Bill of Rights is an essential pillar of constitutionalism 
for in those provisions can be found guarantees for the 
protection of fundamental civil (and socio-economic) 
rights. It is the standard against which governmental 
conduct is adjudged in so far as safeguarding individual 
(and community) rights is concerned. It may, as some 
have argued in the case of the US Constitution, be 
referred to as a ‘Bill of Prohibitions’ because the provi-
sions demarcate areas where the government is pro-
hibited from encroaching. This view is best captured 
by the words of Hornberger (1999) who states, “[T]he 
first 10 amendments to the Constitution… should more 
appropriately have been called the “Bill of Prohibi-
tions” rather than the Bill of Rights...because a careful 
examination reveals that they are express restrictions 
on government powers rather than a grant of rights to 
the citizenry.” To the extent that such rights are safe-
guarded from encroachment by government through the 
judicial arm of government, this becomes a key plank in 
building constitutionalism. 
Nevertheless, Amendment No. 17 shows how it is pos-
sible in the context of weak constitutional structures 
to expose fundamental rights to changes by the execu-
tive through the agency of parliament. The political 
merits or demerits of land reform are not within the 
purview of this article. What is of concern, however, is 
the manner in which Amendment No. 17 interfered with 
the Bill of Rights and the impact of this as a precedent. 
Power had already been used in circumstances where 
the legitimacy of that power was seriously questionable. 
Staunch supporters of the land reform programme may 
argue that the end justified the means, but still one must 
be wary of an approach where the constitution is used 
simply to clothe otherwise arbitrary conduct with legal-
ity and legitimacy. It makes a mockery of the protections 
available in the Bill of Rights if they can be abrogated at 
the whim of the state with a view to covering legal short-
falls through later constitutional changes. 
One way to protect a Bill of Rights or indeed the 
constitution generally from easy amendment is to 
provide for entrenchment provisions9. These provisions 
ensure that certain provisions of the constitution 
are entrenched so that they cannot be amended 
by parliament unless they have been put before a 
referendum. They represent very fundamental parts 
of the constitution that only the direct authority of the 
people can amend. If provisions that were affected by 
Amendment No. 17 and challenged by Campbell had been 
entrenched, the Supreme Court would not have been 
able to rely on the thin ground that section 52(1) of the 
constitution allows for amendments as long as special 
procedures are followed. The entrenchment of specific 
provisions, in particular the Bill of Rights, is something 
the current drafters should consider in order to protect 
the principle of the supremacy of the constitution and 
fundamental rights even from parliament itself, which 
may be compromised by the executive and act simply to 
rubber-stamp executive decisions. 
Independent Judiciary and Judicial Review
The importance of an independent judiciary as a means 
of controlling executive power has already been stated 
as part of the discussion of the principle of separation 
of powers. However, it requires separate attention in 
the current context because of the problem that is often 
encountered in polities where the distinction between 
elected representatives in parliament and the execu-
tive is in practice blurred. Experience in Zimbabwe has 
demonstrated that where the governing party has an 
overwhelming parliamentary majority, the ease with 
which the executive can push through laws, including 
constitutional amendments, exposes the constitution to 
easy and sometimes detrimental changes. 
The problem is that if the judiciary is also compromised, 
then all controls on executive power become redundant. 
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An independent judiciary would have strongly resisted 
the usurpation of its powers but instead the Zimbabwean 
judiciary acquiesced very easily. Anthony Gubbay, the 
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, 
who was hounded out of office by the Zimbabwe govern-
ment, said: “It is a matter of concern that during the eight-
year period preceding the recent formation of the coali-
tion government in Zimbabwe, the avowed policy of the 
executive was to appoint as judges to both the Supreme 
and High Courts, persons known to be sympathetic to its 
political ideology. In this it has been successful.”10
The contrasting judgment of the SADC Tribunal demon-
strates what an independent judiciary might have done 
in those circumstances. If constitutionalism is about the 
control of state power, then surely an independent judici-
ary is an essential structure for this purpose. This article 
does not provide scope to discuss all elements that would 
support the principle of an independent judiciary but it 
suffices to highlight its importance and ensure that in 
the drafting process mechanisms regarding the appoint-
ment, tenure of office, removal, remuneration and re-
sourcing of the judiciary are given proper and necessary 
attention to promote the spirit of constitutionalism. 
Constitutional Conventions and Values
There is a view that there is more to a constitution than 
the written word. This line of thought looks to other 
factors that lie beyond the written constitution. Although 
writing in the context of the British constitution, which 
is widely regarded as unwritten, Dicey stated that beyond 
constitutional laws the system also includes conven-
tions that play a part in effectively limiting governmental 
power. Therefore, even in the absence of a legal limitation, 
such conventions also control the use of power by the gov-
ernment. Conventions have been defined as ‘social rules 
arising within the political community and which impose 
important but non-legal limits on governmental power’11. 
Although not carrying the same weight as legal rules in 
terms of enforceability, such conventions are generally ac-
cepted and followed within the specific polities in which 
they have been developed and established. A common 
example is the convention regarding the Royal Assent to 
Bills passed by the British parliament. The monarch must 
give assent to every Bill before it becomes law but the 
convention established over the years is that such assent 
will not be withheld. Thus, in effect, the power that the 
monarch wields is ceremonial.
The power that the British monarch holds in this regard 
has been reflected in various constitutions, including 
Zimbabwe’s. Under the Lancaster House constitution, 
the office of the president was effectively ceremonial and 
the president had similar powers to the British monarch 
to give assent to Bills passed by parliament. Following 
the same convention established under the Westminster 
model, the president would customarily give assent to 
such Bills. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the 
Executive Presidency after the momentous amendments 
passed in 1987, the situation changed. The executive 
nature of the presidency effectively makes it different 
from the ceremonial role of the British monarch or the 
titular presidency between 1980 and 1987. 
What can be observed is that conventions are really 
customs that are peculiar to each individual country 
or system of governance. They derive from the strug-
gles and developments in each polity. If they are to be 
transplanted, similar conditions would have be in place 
in the new jurisdiction. What may have worked well in 
the US in the wake of the American Revolution and the 
making of the Constitution in 1787 and thereafter may 
not necessarily work in the United Kingdom, which has a 
considerably longer history and different type of strug-
gles and institutions. Similarly, conventions and customs 
developed in India may be considerably different from 
those that have developed in Zimbabwe. The question 
for consideration is whether there are any conventions, 
customs or practices that may be identified within the 
Zimbabwean polity that may be considered as part of 
the broader constitutional package12. This is no easy task 
but one that nevertheless enables a more realistic look 
at governance in the country. Such conventions, if any 
exist, can reveal more about the nature of governance 
and how challenges can be overcome than a mere set of 
rules put together into a constitutional document. 
Conclusion
This article has shown that it is possible for there to be 
a constitution without necessarily embracing constitu-
tionalism. It is possible to justify the use of state power 
on the basis of what a constitution stipulates but that 
does not necessarily demonstrate constitutionalism, if 
powers granted in the constitution are unlimited and 
actually encroach on fundamental rights. Constitutional-
ism signifies limits on state power. It is the antithesis of 
arbitrary power. A constitution that enables, endorses or 
even encourages arbitrary conduct by the state fails the 
test of constitutionalism. Those acting under the con-
stitution may be able to claim constitutionality but they 
would fall short on the measure of constitutionalism. 
The article has demonstrated, through a study of Con-
stitutional Amendment No. 17 and case law from Zim-
babwe’s Supreme Court and the SADC Tribunal, the 
distinction between mere constitutionality and constitu-
tionalism. Amendment No. 17 went against key principles 
of constitutionalism, including the retroactive applica-
tion of legislation, the ouster of judicial jurisdiction, the 
executive’s refusal to comply with court orders and the 
judiciary’s lack of independence. The land issue may 
have been a politically sensitive issue requiring a par-
ticular solution but it is doubtful that this constitutional 
quick-fix was the appropriate remedy. In any event, the 
precedent set by this amendment raises great concern as 
it violated the fundamental division of powers between 
the three arms of the state and encroached on civil liber-
ties in a manner that was not reasonably justifiable and 
could pave the way for similar conduct in future. 
What Madison referred to as ‘auxiliary precautions’ 
constitute the mechanisms, principles and values that 
promote constitutionalism. This article has considered 
some but not all of these auxiliary precautions. Synony-
mous with the rule of law, constitutionalism is about 
upholding the values of society – many of which are now 
recognised to be universally applicable as enshrined 
in various international legal instruments. A constitu-
tion must therefore aspire as far as possible to meet 
the standards set out under international human rights 
charters and agreements since these contain universally 
accepted principles and values. 
Yet after all has been said, for constitutionalism to endure, 
governments must learn to limit themselves. This is a 
challenge for the Zimbabwean government and its coun-
terparts across Africa. As one of Zimbabwe’s eminent 
constitutional scholars put it in a media interview, 
“As a country, we need to develop a culture of constitu-
tionalism so that people respect the constitution. The 
whole process of developing a culture of constitutionalism 
is where people practise what is in their constitution.”13 
As Linnington asserts in the interview, it is common 
knowledge that the Zimbabwean government has not 
always honoured judgments that are not favourable to its 
interests and sometimes legislation has been deliberately 
flouted for political expediency. All this undermines con-
stitutionalism since it shows that the government is un-
willing to stay within limits and that it will try – as it did 
with Amendment No. 17 – to set new limits to condone its 
excesses. Ultimately, as Madison said in that famous essay 
(Federalist No. 51), “ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition” – that the responsibility to promote constitu-
tionalism lies with the men and women charged with the 
powers to govern. If they do not respect the constitution 
and especially the checks and balances within it, then 
constitutionalism is in dire straits. 
The drafters of Zimbabwe’s new constitution have the 
chance not only to create a new document but also to 
promote a constitutional culture that one might refer to 
as constitutionalism. They must seize this chance. 
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